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IN THE:
nuE coiT OF npims of vm
AT RICHMOND
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
V.
MARY L. BOTTO
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR REHEARING
To the Honorable Jvdges of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia:
Your petitioner, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
on August 14, 1928, filed its petition for a rehearing of
the matters involved in the above styled cause on which
an opinion was rendered by this Honorable Court, at
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Wytheville, Virginia, on June 14, 1928, and pursuant to
which an order was entered on June 28,1928, affirming the
judgment of the lower court.
In that petition were set out of the reasons why your
petitioner regarded the order of this Honorable Court as
erroneous; on pages 3 to 5 thereof was a statement of the
facts disclosed by the record followed on pages 5 to 11,
inclusive, by an argument that this court should have
found the lower court guilty of error in not setting aside
the verdict of the jury as contrary to the evidence; on
pages 11 to 13, inclusive, the petitioner stated certain evi
dence discovered after the trial in the lower court, for
which the lower court was requested to grant the petitioner
a new trial and argued that the action of the lower court
in refusing to grant such new trial was erroneous; on pages
13 to 17, inclusive, there were stated certain instructions
which the lower court was requested to grant and refused
to grant and argument was made that the judgment should
be set aside because of the error of the lower court in this
respect; on pages 17 to 19, it was pointed out that this
Honorable Court gave considerable weight in its opinion
to a fact not truly shown by the record, and it was argued
that this court should grant a rehearing because of this
error on the part of this court.
THE CONTROYERSY HAS BECOME MOOT
This case involves only the question whether William
Joseph Botto, the insured in a life insurance policy issued
by defendant, was at the date of institution of the action
(March 10,1927) alive or dead. Since this Court affirmed
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, he has been located
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alive. On August 31st, your petitioner filed in the lower
court on its chancery side, its bill of complaint showing
this fact, and has secured a temporary injunction against
the collection of the judgment, after notice to the attorney
for the plaintiff.
There are inserted in the original of this petition, certi
fied copies of the bill of complaint, four affidavits filed
therewith, including one by the insured himself, and the
injunction order, viz:
VIRGINIA:
IN THE LAW & EQUITY COURT OF THE CITY
OF RICHMOND
PART II
To the HONORABLE FRANK T. SUTTON, JUDGE:
Your complainant. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com
pany, a New York corporation, doing business in the State
of Virginia under and by authority of the laws thereof,
respectfully showeth unto Your Honor the following case:
That, the 17th day of October, 1918, your complainant
issued a policy of life insurance on the life of one WIL
LIAM JOSEPH BOTTO, a resident of the City of Rich
mond, Virginia, and that said Botto disappeared from the
City of Richmond, Virginia, on or about January 5, 1919.
That an action was brought on the law side of this Court
by Mary L. Botto against your complainant on the said
policy of insurance, in which the plaintiff alleged that your
complainant owed her the sum of one thousand dollars
($1,000.00) "because of the disappearance and death of
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William Joseph Botto, husband of the plaintiff ♦ ♦ ♦ who
disappeared and died on or about the 5th day of January,
1919, in the City of Richmond;" thus basing her claim
solely upon the presumption of the death of said Botto as
alleged.
That the 8th day of July, 1927, a judgment was rendered
against your complainant in the action aforesaid for the
sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). This judgment
the Court refused to set aside when asked to do so on the
ground that it was contrary to the law and the evidence,
and the judgment was later affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia by its decision rendered June 14,
1928. That, under the rule of the Supreme Court of Ap
peals of Virginia, your complainant had the right to file a
petition for a rehearing at any time within fifteen days
after the commencement of the next term of the Court
which meets in Staunton, Virginia, September 11, 1928.
That, subsequent to the said decision of the Court of
Appeals and whilst the right to file a petition for a re
hearing was had by your complainant, to-wit, the 6th day
of August, 1928, the said William J. Botto was found alive
in the City of Baltimore, Maryland, and that day made
affidavit certifying as to his identity and the circumstances
surrounding his desertion of his family and disappearance
from Richmond, and that the same day he was photo
graphed by one William Sturm in the said City of Balti
more, all of which more fully appears in the affidavits of
said Botto and Sturm attached to this bill as a part hereof.
That the said William Joseph Botto was so late as the 6th
day of August, 1928, likewise known to others to be alive,
as will appear from the affidavits of Lawrence M. Serra
and Edward J. Dunn filed herewith.
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That the major facts surrounding- the existence and dis
covery of said Botto on or about the 3rd day of August,
1928, were given wide publicity in the Baltimore and Rich
mond daily papers, and that your complainant, through its
counsel, has apprised Mary L. Botto through her counsel
of the present existence of said Botto and has offered to
show him the aforesaid photograph and affidavits, but that
counsel for Mary L. Botto declines to act in any way to
remedy the injustice herein complained of.
That, in March, 1921, the plaintiff, Mary L. Botto, swore
out and had placed in the hands of the police authorities
of the City of Richmond a warrant for the arrest of said
William Joseph Botto on the ground of the desertion and
non-support of his family, and that, upon learning of the
existence of said Botto in August, 1928, the Richmond
police sought the plaintiff to have her request the execu
tion of said warrant, such request being necessary before
said Botto could be extradited from Maryland and brought
back to Richmond for trial, but that said plaintiff has de
clined to make such request, and your complainant is now
advised that further proceedings against said Botto on said
warrant will be suspended.
That plaintiff, Mary L. Botto, well knows, or should
have known, that said Botto is alive and not dead, as
alleged in her notice of motion in the aforesaid action at
law, and that nevertheless and notwithstanding the gross
injustice to your complainant, the said Mary L. Botto has
caused to be issued and placed in the hands of J. Herbert
Mercer, Sheriff of the City of Richmond, for execution a
certain writ of fieri facias, and has served upon the Rich
mond Trust Company, where your complainant keeps its
bank account in this City, a notice of the lien of said fi. fa.
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and has caused a levy to he made upon your complainant's
office furniture and fixtures located in its office at Third
and Grace Streets, Richmond, Virginia, and has caused
the same to be advertised for sale, to prevent which your
complainant and the National Surety Company were forced
to execute and deliver to the Sheriff a forthcoming bond,
with Lindsay H. Blanton as their surety. Copies of said
execution and bond are filed herewith as a part hereof,
marked Exhibits "A" and "B".
That said bond was dated the 7th day of August, 1928,
and called for the property upon which levy had been made
to be forthcoming the 20th day of August, 1928, at 12
o'clock Noon; that, accordingly, said bond was not forfeited
until the said 20th day of August, 1928, at 12 o'clock Noon,
but that the said J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, returned said bond to the Clerk of the
Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, be
fore the forfeiture, to-wit, the 8th day of August, 1928, at
3:50 o'clock P. M.
That a petition for the rehearing of the aforesaid case is
now pending before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir
ginia, having been filed vsdth the Clerk of said Court in
Staunton, Virginia,. August 11, 1928, but that your com
plainant is not advised as to when a decision on said peti
tion will be rendered.
That plaintiff, disregarding the right of your com
plainant to file a petition for rehearing and. in spite of
the fact that your complainant has filed a petition for
rehearing, has in every way pressed, and continues to
press, for payment of the aforesaid judgment, in spite of
the fact that she knows, and has known for some time,
that the said William Joseph Botto, upon whose death the
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said judgment was based, is not dead, but was alive ,so
late as the 6th day of August, 1928, and that she has no
just claim whatsoever against your complainant. That
your complainant is informed and believes that the said
Mary L. Botto is without estate sufficient to refund the
amount of the said judgment if it be.collected by her and,
if paid to her, your complainant would have no remedy
whatsoever.
That your complainant did not procure or consent to
said judgment of the Law & Equity Court of the City of
Richmond, Part II, or in any way acquiesce in it, or waive
any of the errors complained of; that the present situation
is in no way due to the neglect or carelessness of your com
plainant, and that there is an attempt and threat to en
force said judgment which is injurious to your complainant
as it stands and which will further injure it if enforced.
That the evidence discovered since the trial of said case,
to-wit, in August of the year 1928, is such that had it
been available at the trial in July, 1927, there should have
been a judgment for your complainant. That said evidence
could not in any way have been discovered or obtained by
your complainant in time for the trial aforesaid; that it is
material inasmuch as it goes to disprove the only ground
upon which plaintiff's judgment was based; that it is not
cumulative, corroborative or collateral to any evidence
which was produced or could have been produced at the
trial. That the present situation has come about through
no fault of your complainant, but that it comes into this
Court with clean hands and is entitled to relief.
YOUR COMPLAINANT, therefore, prays that the said
Mary L. Botto and J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City
of Richmond, Virginia, be made parties defendant to this
C8J
bill of injunction and required to answer the same, but
answer under oath by said defendants and by each of them
is expressly waived in accordance with the statute law of
Virginia for such cases made and provided; that the said
Mary L. Botto, her agents and attorneys, and the said J.
Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of Richmond, be en
joined and restrained from any and all further effort to
collect said judgment of July 8, 1927, and from in any way
attempting to enforce the execution issued thereon or the
forthcoming bond given to prevent the sale of the property
of this complainant levied on, or to enforce the lien of said
fieri facias against persons having in possession money or
other property of this complainant; that Your Honor will
grant a mandatory injunction requring the said judgment
to be marked as null and void on the order book of this
Court and on the lien docket of the Chancery Court of the
City of Richmond; and that Your Honor will grant to
your complainant such other and further general relief as
may be necessary and to equity may seem meet, to fully
protect it in the premises.
AND YOUR COMPLAINANT will ever pray etc.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
By counsel.
Wellford & Taylor,
Counsel for complainant.
State of Virginia,
City of Richmond, to-wit:
THIS DAY personally appeared before me, Mary P.
Steinlein, a Notary Public in and for the City of Richmond
in the State of Virginia, J. McD. WELLFORD, personally
known to me, who made oath before me in my said City
[93
that the statements contained in the foregoing petition for
injunction so far as made of his own knowledge are true
and so far as made from statements and facts derived from
others he believes them to be true.
J. McD. WELLFORD.
GIVEN UNDER my hand this 29th day of August, 1928.
MARY P. STEINLEIN,
Notary Public.
Teste:
LUTHER LIBBY,
Clerk.
VIRGINIA:
IN THE LAW AND EQUITY COURT OF THE
CITY OF RICHMOND, PART TWO, the 31st
day of August, 1928.
IN VACATION.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
a corporation, plaintiff
against In Chancery
Mary L. Botto, and J. Herbert Mercer,
Sheriff of the City of Richmond, defendants
This day came the complainant by counsel and tendered
its bill of complaint, duly sworn to, and Exhibits A and B
filed therewith, and the affidavits of William Joseph Botto,
William Sturm, Lawrence M. Serra and Edward J. Dunn,
also filed with the said bill, and the notices of motion for
an injunction duly served on the defendant, Mary L. Botto,
and her counsel, Thomas A. Williams, also this day filed.
And thereupon came the defendant, Mary L. Botto, by
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counsel, and objected to the granting of the injunction
prayed for, and the motion for the injunction was argued
by counsel.
Whereupon, the Court, after reading the bill, having
heard the argument by counsel, and being satisfied of the
complainant's equity, doth order that the said Mary L.
Botto and J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of Rich
mond, Virginia, their agents and attorneys, be and they are
hereby enjoined from in any way attempting to collect the
judgment rendered against the Metropolitan Life Insur
ance Company in favor of Mary L. Botto July 8, 1927, and
from in any way attempting to enforce the execution issued
thereon or the forthcoming bond given to prevent the sale
of the property levied on by the said Sheriff, and from
enforcing the lien of the said fi. fa. against any person
or persona having in possession money or other property
belonging to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
It is further ordered that this injunction shall expire
on the 20th day of September, 1928, unless before that time
continued, enlarged or dissolved by the Court. But the
plaintiff shall not have the benefit of this injunction until
it or someone for it shall have first entered into bond with
approved security before the Clerk of this Court in the
penalty of $1,500.00 conditioned to- pay all costs and dam
ages which may be awarded against it should this injunc
tion be dissolved.
A Copy—^Teste::
LUTHER LIBBY,
Clerk.
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Gity of Baltimore, )
) ss:
State of Maryland. )
William Joseph Botto, sometimes known as Richard or
Dick Barto, at present an inmate of the Baltimore City
Hospitals, having been duly sworn under oath, deposes and
says as follows:
That he was born in the City of Richmond, Virginia, on
the 28th day of January in the year of 1885; that his
father's name was James O. and his mother's name was
Margaret T. Slattery, both deceased, that he is married.
His wife's name being Mary L. Botto, nee Parsons, and
that he has two living children, Helen and Irene, age 16
and age 15, respectively.
That he is an electrician by trade and was at one time
a member of the Police and Fire Departments of the City
of Richmond, Virginia. That on October 18, 1918, he
secured an insurance policy on his life with the Metro
politan Life Insurance Company of New York City for one
thousand dollars on the Limited Payment Life Plan, Inter
mediate Class, payable Semi-Annually, $17.82. The said
insurance policies bearing numbers 2574471-72-C. Said in
surance policies were payable to his wife, Mary L. Botto,
at which time he resided at number 2516 East Grace Street,
Richmond, Virginia. That on or about January 15, 1919,
he left his wife and children because of incompatibility, and
has never returned.
That since he left Richmond, Virginia, he has resided
most of the time in the City of Baltimore, Maryland, and a
number of his relatives and friends frequently visited him.
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His sister, Mrs. Margaret Hirshberg, of 2401 East Grace
Street, personally called on him in Baltimore, Maryland,
in the early part of the year 1925. She came because she
heard he was sick.
He frequently and particularly during the Cristmas holi
days sent the season's greetings by postal card.
That his brother, Thomas A. Botto, of 3229 Idelwood
Avenue, Richmond, Virginia, visited him in Baltimore
about the same time and on a former occasion that his
brother-in-law, Officer John Duffey, of the Richmond, Vir
ginia, Police Department, also visited him in Baltimore
less than one year ago. At the time of this visit, Lieu
tenant Edward Dunn, of the Baltimore Police Department,
was with his brother-in-law, John Duffey.
That Jimmy Donatti, a friend, now residing at 2211-A
East Broad Street, Richmond, Virginia, was staying with
him in Reading, Pennsylvania, up to eight months ago.
Deponent further says that several months ago he heard
he had been declared dead by the courts of Richmond, Vir
ginia, on the application made by his wife, Mary L. Botto,
nee .
That said decision is absolutely contrary to facts since he
(Botto) the party e?ivolved, is alive and states that the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company should not be un
justly called upon and forced to pay one thosmd dollars
which is not a legitimate claim.
E. B. O'Connor, Stagg Powell and Ed Cordin, all of Rich
mond, Virginia, visited deponent in Baltimore within the
past two years. The deponent further says that he has
been photographed simultaneously with the execution of
[13]
this affidavit and that a copy of said photograph is to be
attached to this affidavit.
Wins. J. Botto.
Sworn and subscribed to in my presence on this sixth day
of August, 1928.
IDA M. KISSINGER,
Notary /Republic.
(NOTARIAL
SEAL)
I, LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk of the Law and Equity Court
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do hereby certify that
the foregoing is a true copy of an affidavit of Wms.
J. Botto, filed with the bill of complaint in the cause of
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company against Mary
L. Botto and J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of
Richmond, and that identical photographs are attached to
the respective affidavits filed with the bill above mentioned.
LUTHER LIBBY,
Clerk.
City of Baltimore, )
) ss:
State of Maryland. )
Lawrence M. Serra residing at Balto. City Hospitals be
ing duly sworn and under oath deposes and says that the
photograph attached to this affidavit and bearing the
initials of the deponent is the photograph of a patient now
in this hospital under medical treatment and registered
under the name of Richard Barto, .
LAWRENCE M. SERRA.
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Sworn and subscribed to in my presence on this sixth
day of August, 1928.
IDA M. KISSINGER,
Notary Public.
(NOTARIAL
SEAL)
I, LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk of the Law and Equity Court
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do hereby certify that
the foregoing is a true copy of an affidavit of Lawrence
M. Serra, filed with the bill of complaint in the cause of
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company against Mary
L. Botto and J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of
Richmond, and that identical photographs ^re attached to
the respective affidavits filed with the bill above mentioned.
LUTHER LIBBY,
Clerk.
CITY OF BALTIMORE,
STATE OF MARYLAND.
William Sturm residing in the City of Baltimore, Md.,
being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is employed by
the Baltimore News in the capacity of a photographer.
That on August 6, 1928, he made a photograph of one
William Joseph Botto in the Baltimore City Hospital where
the said William J. Botto is registered under the name of
Richard Barto. That the photograph attached to this
affidavit bearing his initials, is the photograph taken by
him as aforementioned. That the person he photographed
in the Baltimore City Hospital told him his name was Wil
liam J. Botto, bom in Richmond, Va., age about 43, and
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the same William J. Botto who signed an affidavit simul
taneously with the taking of this photograph.
WILLIAM STURM.
Sworn and subscribed to in my presence on this sixth
day of August, 1928.
EMIL F. GOEBEL,
Notary Public.
(NOTARIAL
SEAL)
I, LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk of the Law and Equity Court
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do hereby certify that
the foregoing is a true copy of an affidavit* of William
Sturm, filed with the bill of complaint in the cause of
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company against Mary
L. Botto and J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of
Richmond, and that identical photographs are attached to
the respective affidavits ^led with the bill above mentioned.
LUTHER LIBBY,
Clerk.
City of Baltimore, )
) ss:
State of Maryland. )
Edward J. Dunn, a detective lieutenant of the Baltimore
Police Department, residing at 427 N. Kenwood Avenue,
having been duly sworn under oath, deposes and says that
about one year ago a detective named John Duffey, of the
Richmond, Virginia, Police Department, with whom he
was personally acquainted, came to Baltimore. That de
ponent met and talked with the said John Duffey on that
occasion.
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That John Duffey introduced the deponent, Edward John
Dunn, to his brother-in-law, a certain William Joseph
Botto, and were together for several hours.
That on Saturday, August 4, 1928, deponent visited the
Baltimore City Hospitals believing that a Richard Barto
mentioned in a newspaper report as having been scalded
and brought to that institution for treatment, was the Wil
liam J. Botto with whom he was acquainted.
That he immediately recognized the patient shown to
him registered under the name of Richard Barto as Dick
Botto, brother-in-law of deponent's friend, John Duffey, of
Richmond, Virginia, Police Department whom he had met
as aforesaid.
Deponent further says that the said patient found in the
Baltimore City Hospitals was photographed and that a
copy of the said photograph is attached and made part of
this affidavit.
EDWARD J. DUNN.
Sworn and subscribed to in my presence on this sixth
day of August, 1928.
EMIL F. GOEBEL,
Notary JZepublic.
(NOTARIAL
SEAL)
I, LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk of the Law and Equity Court
of the City of Richmond, Part Two, do hereby certify that
the foregoing is a true copy of an affidavit of Edward
J. Dunn, filed with the bill of complaint in the cause of
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company against Mary
L. Botto and J. Herbert Mercer, Sheriff of the City of
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Richmond, and that identical photographs are attached to
the respective affidavits filed with the bill above mentioned.
LUTHER LIBBY,
Clerk.
As shown by the foregoing papers, there is no longer
any question between plaintiff and defendant.
In Ficklen V. City of Danville, 146 Va. 426, it was said:
'*We are convinced that the matters in issue be
tween the parties to this cause have been placed
beyond the realm of controversy, and are non
existent.
"If we should undertake to pass upon the ques
tions presented in the petition for an appeal our
opinion would be merely a decision upon moot ques
tions.
"It is thoroughly established in Virginia that
under such circumstances the appellate court should
refrain from passing upon controverted questions
which have been removed, by occurrences taking
place since the judgment of the trial court."
It is for this reason, respectfully prayed that a rehear
ing be granted, and that upon such rehearing an order be
entered reciting the fact of the discovery since the date of
the judgment of this Court, of new and incontrovertible
evidence that the insured is alive, and vacating the judg
ment entered herein at the June term, and awarding the
plaintiff-in-error a new trial.
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THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AT THE JUNE TERM
CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS
Since the discovery of the existence of the essential
fact above shown at the late date at which it has been dis
covered is so unusual an occurrence in practice, the peti
tioner is not sure beyond the peradventure of a doubt that
the Court will at once concede that its discovery must
cause the termination of these proceedings by an order
vacating the judgment. And for that reason (despite the
confidance of its attorneys that they have proceeded in
the only available method to bring to the knowledge of
the court the mistake which has been made) petitioner
believes it proper to set forth reasons appearing in the
record for the granting of the rehearing, in addition to
those'* stated in its original petition.
The purpose of the present petition being supplemental,
rather than amendatory, your petitioner will endeavor to
avoid repetition of arguments made in the original peti
tion and respectfully prays that notwithstanding the con
tents of this supplemental petition, that the original peti
tion be fully read and considered by the court.
The occasion for filing a supplemental petition is, of
course, frankly, to urge, more emphatically than it has
been urged heretofore, if possible, a rehearing of the
cause; a distinctly important, if secondary purpose of the
filing of the supplemental petition is to point out that re
gardless of the final adjudication of this case it is in the
interest of the maintenance of confidence in the doctrine
of stare decisis that the opinion in this cause setting out
in full the evidence disregarded by the jury in its finding,
and setting out the fact that there was no evidence before
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the jury in conflict with that disregarded by it, and that
the witnesses of the defendant were not impeached in any
sense and concluding that nevertheless the trial court was
right in refusing to set aside the verdict, should not be
allowed to go out as an opinion of this Honorable Court
to unsettle the law in respect to the rule of decision of this
court in the seeting aside of verdicts of juries upon appeal,
and to confuse the profession.
It is also of the highest importance that the portion of
the opinion dealing with the right to a new trial on the
ground of after discovered evidence should; not be allowed
to stand unaltered, because it too is in grave conflict with
what has heretofore been understood to be the law.
Of secondary importance to the bar and to the public,
but of large importance to the plaintiff in error and to
life insurance companies and their policyholders is the
effect of the opinion in its alteration of what has hereto
fore been understood to be the law governing claims for
death benefits in the case of the disappearance of an in
sured person.
In order that this supplemental petition may deal with
the opinion completely, it should be understood that its
pertinent parts are being dealt with here seriatim, and
that nothing of moment- in the opinion is purposely being
omitted from this discussion:
Is the Holding of the Court That the Lower Court Cor.
rectly Refused to Set Aside the Verdict, a
Correct Holding?
It will be recalled that the only reliance of the plaintiff
in support of her theory that the insured was dead at the
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time of the institution of the suit, was that more than
seven years before he being under no financial pressure,
and there being no discord between himi and his wife, he
went to work one niorning and she had not heard from
him since. Under these circumstances she invoked the
common law presumption, confirmed by statute in Vir
ginia, of death resulting from seven years' absence. De
fendant did not undertake to prove domestic discord, fear
of criminal prosecution, pressure of debt, or any other cir
cumstance designed to weaken the presumption. Defendant
introduced a brother of the insured and a sister of the in
sured who testifying in 1927, said they had seen him a num
ber of times in the City of Baltimore in 1925, and talked to
him over long periods at these meetings. Neither the
brother nor the sister of the insured was impeached by evi
dence of bad character, their general reputation for truth
and veracity, insanity, prior conflicting statements, adverse
financial interests, inherent incredibility of their testimony,
the presence of the witness at another place at the time
that the witness testified of being present with the insured,
self-contradictory statements, or other impeaching evi
dence. The jury simply found from the presumption of
death, that insured was dead; and simply rejected as
malicious perjury the perfectly explicit and circumstantial
testimony of the brother and the sister of several recent
intimate contacts with the insured, the insured being alive.
In its opinion, this court criticizes the evidence of the two
witnesses in a number of respects and points out several
omissions of defendant to prove facts it might have proved,
anticipatory to stating its conclusion that this court should
not under the law of the State of Virginia interfere with
the verdict of a jury under those circumstances. We now
list these criticisms of the testimony, and criticisms of the
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defendant for failing to prove facts which it did not prove,
and following each criticism we undertake to show that the
criticism is simply not based on logic.
1. "After so long a separation from their brother, the
meeting described by thesetwo witnesses seems grotesque."
One witness said she saw the insured several times over
a period of two week's (Rec. p. 36), and the other testified
to two meetings (Rec. p. 35); the female witness only testi
fied of the place of one of her meetings, with the insured,
when she went to visit him and he saw her approaching
and came outside to see her and they stood on the street
and talked; the male witness did not give any details of
either of his meetings except that he said that one of them
lasted three or four hours.
2. "Neither of them could tell his correct address."
One witness said the address was either at 204 or 402
Pearl Street and the other that it was either 204 or 208
Pearl Street; considering the humble station of the wit
nesses, and their lack of education (see Mrs. Hirschberg's
letter at page 38 of the record saying "Mr. Bethel & Wil
liams" and saying "the last I seen of him") and that they
were testifying to a mere house number, which many people
would never have observed at all, it would be more reason
able for this court to have commented adversely upon the
witnesses if they had each been able to state precisely the
house number than to criticise them for not knowing it
precisely.
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3. "Neither of them could tell his occupation".
The male witness stated on examination-in-chief (Rec.
p. 36) that the insured was not "doing anything"; the
female witness was not asked any questions in reference
to the occupation of the insured.
4. "Neither of them could repeat one word that would
throw light on the question of his disappearance".
The record shows that neither witness was asked by the
attorneys for either side to repeat anything that the in
sured said explaining his absence from Richmond and that
neither witness was asked any question calling for an ex
pression by the witness of any belief entertained by the
witness as to the explanation of the absence of the insured.
5. "As far as the record shows, the brother and sister
did not communicate the fact of their brother's presence
in Baltimore to anyone".
In a letter from the attorneys for the plaintiff to one of
these witnesses, Mrs. Hirschberg, dated February 12, 1926,
the attorneys said (Rec. p. 37), "Your sister, Mrs. J. M.
Duffy, advised us that you had some information about Mr.
William J. Botto" and "Mrs. Duffy stated to us that you
could give us the information as to his whereabouts". So
the truth is the record does show that Mrs. Hirschberg did
communicate the fact of her brother's presence in Balti
more to her sister, Mrs. J. M. Duffy. In addition, Mrs.
Hirschberg wrote the attorneys for the plaintiff in Febru
ary, 1926, (Rec. p. 38), that she had seen the insured in
March, 1925; and the other witness Thomas Botto said
[23]
(Rec. p. 36) notthat hehad nottold anyone of his brother's
presence in Baltimore, but that he did not tell "anyone
outside the family". Considering the fact that as sworn
to by the plaintiff she had caused a warrant for abandon
ment and non-support to be issued against the insured
(Rec. pp. 28, 29), what could be more natural than that the
brother and sister did not communicate to her the where
abouts of the insured ? What other course would have been
more consitent with what is known of human nature?
6. "This letter (a letter testified by the sister of the in
sured to have been received by her from him in the spring
of 1927, but which she did not introduce in evidence) prop
erly authenticated would no doubt have settled the question
in issue, but it was not produced or its absence accounted
for".
How could the letter to Mrs. Hirschberg have been
authenticated by the defendant except by her testimony
that she received it through the mail, and believed it to be
from her brother? If all of her testimony, other than that,
was to have been rejected by the jury, as deliberately per
jured, (and on no other theory couldthe verdict which was
found have been found) how much would it have aided the
defendant, to have had this letter introduced, and its
authenticity established by Mrs. Hirschberg? It is sub
mitted that the attorney for the plaintiff having failed to
make an objection to the evidence of Mrs. Hirschberg of
the receipt of the letter, as being secondary evidence, on
the ground that the letter itself should be introduced and
having failed on cross-examination to call for the produc
tion of the letter, the defendant was entitled to the full
benefit of her statement that she did receive a letter which
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she believed to have been written by the insured and it
was not only encumbent on the jury to believe that state
ment (in the complete absence of any impeachment, or con
flicting evidence) but also is the duty of the court before
which the case is now pending to treat it as a fact not in
any manner in conflict, but established by competent evi
dence, that Mrs. Hirschberg did receive a letter from the
insured in the spring of 1927, or at least a letter which she
believed to be from the insured.
7. "Both Botto and Mrs. Hirschberg testified that they
were not on 'speaking terms' with the plaintiff. This fact
the jury had a right to consider in determiing whether or
not they were biased or prejudiced".
It was the plaintiff, and not Thomas Botto or Mrs.
Hirschberg who first testified (Rec. p. 29) that she was
not on "good terms" with Thomas Botto and Mrs. Hirsch
berg, but when did the fact that two persons are not on
"speaking terms" or "good terms" with another, come to
be a fact which can reasonably be used as the premise for
a conclusion by a jury that the witnesses have gone on the
stand, and deliberately perjured themselves? If there was
any evidence of bad character, bad general reputation as
to truth and veracity, insanity, prior conflicting, or present
self-contradictory statements, financial interests, inherent
incredibility of the testimony, or if there was any evidence
whatever in conflict with the evidence of the witnesses,
the jury would be justified; but in the absence of any im
peaching evidence, and in the absence of any conflicting
evidence, surely it has never been held before in Virginia
that a jury could disregard the evidence, in favor of a mere
rebuttable presumption.
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\ 8. "In rebuttal, the plaintiff testified that the purported
\ signature of the husband on the assignment (an assign
ment purporting to have been executed before a Notary-
Public more than ten months after the disappearance of
the insured, but the Notary Public having been introduced
to the insured, as the insured, and not having known him
personally) was not his signature. No sur-rebuttal evi
dence was offered by the defendant to sustain the alleged
signature—a pregnant circumstance when it is shown by
the record that the brother and sister of the insured were
own the alleged signature in the presence of the jury
d not called as witnesses to sustain it."
suggested above, it would have been rather remark-
abi had the defendant's attorney have supposed that it
wow strengthen defendant's case to have the brother and
siste\say that the signature was in their opinion that of
the inured, on the theory that such testimony by the
broths and sister would establish that the insured had
been aRo in 1919, when the brother and sister had already
gone onW stand and sworn in the most positive terms of
intimateVntact^ith him, during his life, in the year 1925.
And instq of the occurrence referred to constituting evi
dence for plaintiff, casting doubt upon the fact that the
insured wai^ndeed alive in 1919, it speaks well indeed for
the veracitj^ the brother and sister of the insured, and
very ponderl^ly against the only theory on which the
verdict may I sustained (that the jury was entitled to
conclude that l^h the brother and sister were perjurers)
that not being that the signature was that of their
brother, they w4, unwilling to so testify.
As pointed out We, these two witnesses were of humble
station, and atleas^g^ Hirschberg was quite uneducated;
I
\
\
\
[26]
their brother had been away from Richmond for more than
seven years at the time of the trial; how then could the
opinion or either witness have strengthened materially the
case of the defendant, because these witnesses said that
they believed the signature on the alleged assignment pur
porting to have been executed in 1919, was their brother's
signature?
9. In the opinion are quoted two letters from the
Assistant Secretary of the plaintiff in error which state*
that an inspector employed by it had seen the insured
the summer of 1926, but declined to disclose to the pla^-
tiff's attorneys where he was seen by the inspector, /he
opinion omits to quote defendant's letter of Februaf 2,
1926, (Rec. p. 34) from which it appears that defe<Jant
learned of the whereabouts of the insured from th rela
tives of the insured. These people were protecting'^ © in
sured (as has since developed, but was not knowj^y the
defendant until the trial) from criminal process sued by
his wife. The inference is quite unavoidable th" the un
willingness of defendant to communicate the w®^^eabouts
of the insured to his wife was based not only^ some ex
tent upon a loyalty to the insured, but to a extent
upon the unwillingness to use the informafi communi
cated to defendant by the relatives of the^sured, in a
manner not desired by its communicants.
10. "It was in the power of the d^^d^-nt to have
established the truth of these letters by t' introduction, as
a witness, of the agent who had 'locat' interviewed'
the insured. From its failure to produ ^^is witness or to
account for his non-production the Warranted in
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drawing the conclusion that the witness, if produced, would
not support the allegations in the letters."
This statement does not pertain to the right of the jury
to disregard as perjured evidence, the testimony of the
two witnesses, the sister and brother of the insured. But
it is also to be borne in mind that defendant did not intro
duce either of the letters quoted in the opinion, and did not
claim, the benefit as substantive evidence of anything con
tained in them, and was accordingly not under any obliga
tion to establish the truth of what was stated in them; it
would have been extremely faulty reasoning on the part
of defendant's attorney for him to have supposed that it
would help the defendant's case to bring its hired agent to
court, to testify of interviews with the insured; unless de
fendant's attorney had satisfactorily proved his case by
the testimony of the brother and sister, then, there was
no method, short of the production of the insured in court,
which was not possible, by which that case could have been
proven.
The opinion proceeds, after the foregoing criticisms of
the evidence of the defendant, and of the conduct of the
defendant in not proving facts which it omitted to prove,
to admit the truth of the general proposition that the evi
dence of an unimpeached witness, if not inherently in
credible, should be believed; the opinion then goes on as
follows:
"But the fact that a witness has not been im
peached—employing the term in its common ac
ceptation—^is not conclusively binding upon the
jury.".
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This statement in the opinion is admittedly a correct
statement of an abstract proposition of law; the cases cited
in support of it show how far from true the statement is,
when it is made to support the conclusion of the court that
in a case like that at bar, where there is no conflict in the
evidence, and no impeaching evidence whatever, a jury
will be permitted completely to disregard direct proof by
eye witnesses, concluding the only issue in the case, and to
bring in a verdict in conflict with it.
The flrst case cited is Horton's Case, 99 Va. 855; (the
correct page number is 848); the opinion cites this case to
support' the statement that the jury are the judges of the
credibility of a witness, and have the right to determine
from his appearance on the stand, his manner of testify
ing, his candor and fairness, his contradictions, if any,
what weight shall be given to his evidence. In the Horton
Case Judge Keith wrote the opinion, and he did not say
what Judge Campbell, in this opinion quotes him as say
ing, but instead said this:
"No one, perhaps, sees the whole of what is pass
ing before him. Each testifies from his own point
of view, which differs in a greater or less degree
from that of others, but if their statements are con
tradictory and irreconcilable, then the jury have,
as we have seen in discussing the instructions, the
right to determine from the appearance of the wit
nesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, and
their apparent candor and fairness, their apparent
intelligence or lack of intelligence, and from all the
other surrounding circumstances which are more
worthy of credit."
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The opinion then quotes Professor Wigmore, and quotes
from a Maryland case, general statements of law, and then
cites Clapton's Case, 109 Va. 818, another case where Judge
Keith wrote the opinion, and quotes a textbook statement
quoted in that opinion that where the statements of a wit
ness are "grossly improbable" or he has "an interest in the
question at issue," a jury may discredit his testimony not
withstanding that he is unimpeached and uncontradicted.
And that the testimony of a witness may be wholly rejected
by a jury, if from his manner and the improbability of his
story or his self-contradiction in the several parts of his
narrative, the jury become convinced that he is not speak
ing the truth; and that this is true although he be not at
tacked in his reputation or contradicted by other witnesses.
It will be observed from the foregoing that in order for
the jury to be at liberty to discredit the testimony of a
witness, his statement must be either "grossly improbable"
or he must have "an interest in the question at issue" or
"his manner and the improbability of his story or his self-
contradiction in the several parts of his narrative" must
convince the jury that he is not speaking the truth.
In this case a Virginia statute declared that the posses
sion of a United States Internal Revenue tax receipt for
the sale of ardent spirits in the State of Virginia should be
prima fade evidence of the sale of liquor. The accused was
charged with the unlawful sale of liquor in Gloucester
County and the Commonwealth introduced in order to con
vict him, only a United States Internal Revenue tax re
ceipt ; the accused and his confidential clerk both denied any
sale of liquor in Gloucester County by the accused. The
jury found the accused guilty and the Supreme Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment against the accused entered
upon the verdict.
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The Virginia statute under which he was convicted said
that after prima facie evidence had been introduced as in
dicated the burden was upon the accused "of showing that
he has not violated the law" and that "in the absence of
satisfactory proof that he has not violated the law" he
should be convicted. This court did not disturb the ver
dict, and in explaining why it did not disturb the verdict,
it quoted the language incorporated by Judge Campbell
into the present opinion, and also quoted the language
which Judge Campbell quotes from the Maryland case
above referred to, and also quotes the statement from Wig-
more on Evidence which Judge Campbell quoted, above re
ferred to.
While prohibition laws and the decisions in proceedings
under them have somewhat altered previously existing con
cepts, it is by no means necessary to your petitioner to se
cure an overruling of the actual decision in Clopton's Case,
in order to sustain its contention that this court should re
ject as not supported by the evidence, the verdict in the
Botto Case. It was certainly "grossly improbable" that a
Gloucester County druggist would secure a Federal license
to sell liquor, except for the purpose of selling it; there is
nothing "grossly improbable" in the testimony of Thomas
Botto and Mrs. Hirschberg that they several times visited
their brother, the insured, in Baltimore; equally certainly
the accused Clopton and his confidential clerk had an in
terest in the question at issue in that case, which is entirely
missing in the case at bar; in that case the burden was on
Clopton to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he had
not violated the prohibition law; in our case the burden
was on the defendant simply to rebut by proof of facts
inconsistent with a presumption, the conclusion which in
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the absence of any evidence was rendered proper by the
existence of the presumption.
There was nothing improbable in Thomas Botto and Mrs.
Hirschberg seeing their brother several times in Baltimore,
but there was a distinct improbability of Clopton procuring
a Federal liquor selling license, and then not selling the
liquor; there was no self-contradiction in the evidence of
either Thomas Botto or Mrs. Hirschberg; and reading their
evidence as it appears in the record it is submitted that no
part of it may be pointed out and justly criticized as indi
cating that the whole is false.
The next case cited and quoted from in the opinion is
C. & 0. v. Barger, 112 Va. 692, in which the court is quoted
as having said:
"A jury is not bound to accept as conclusive the
testimony even of an unimpeached witness."
This case is reported at page 688. In the case, a medical
expert testified as a matter of opinion, and not of fact, that
the miscarriage of which the plaintiff complained against
the railroad company was the result of an antecedent cause,
and not of an injury sustained while she was a passenger.
At page 690, in sustaining the verdict of the jury which
discredited the testimony of the doctor, the court said:
"In addition, his view is in direct conflict with
other expert testimony and circumstances adduced
by the plaintiff."
At page 691, the court said:
"We have said enough to show that the evidence
on that issue was conflicting."
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Then the court said what it is quoted by Judge Camp
bell as having said, Judge Campbell only quoting the last
one of the two sentences which appear together in the
opinion at page 692:
"The verdict shows that the jury disregarded, as
they had the right to do, the expert opinion of Dr.
Givens, and rested their finding upon the other evi
dence tending to sustain the plaintiff's theory. A
jury is not bound to accept as conclusive the testi
mony even of an unimpeached witness."
Lower down on that page t|ie court especially calls at
tention to the difference between the obligation of a jury
to accept the testimony of ordinary witnesses, and its obli
gation with respect to acceptance of the testimony of ex
pert witnesses.
It is submitted that enough has been said to indicate
that neither the criticisms in the opinion, of the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff in error, nor the criticisms of the
plaintiff in error for not adducing other evidence, nor the
authority cited in support of the conclusion of the court
justify its conclusion that the action of the trial court in
overruling the motion to set aside the verdict of the jury
was without error.
And we submit that the necessity for reliance upon the
Clopton Case and the Barger Case for support of the con
clusions of the court, in this totally dissimilar case, in the
presence of, but without giving any consideration to the
hundreds of cases which this Honorable Court has decided
in which it has held that on a demurrer to the evidence it
will set aside a verdict which is manifestly contrary to the
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weight of the evidence, compels recognition of the error
in the decision.
2.
Is the Court Right in Approving, for the Reasons Assigned
By It, the Refusal of the Instructions Requested
by Defendant?
Of these instructions the opinion states:
"These instructions sought to impose upon the
jury the duty of determining the sufficiency of the
proof of death, as a condition precedent to the right
of action. No error was committed by the court
in this regard. It was the province of the court to
determine the question."
These instructions are quoted on pages 13 and 14 of the
original petition for a rehearing. The first one imposed no
duty on the jury, but merely stated a rule of law. The
second one referred to all of the communications from the
plaintiff to the defendant, and stated that taken together
they did not reach the standard required by law as stated
in the first instruction; it then stated that unless the jury
believed that further proof was furnished (and the record
shows that none was) they must find for the plaintiff. The
instructions were designed to and did clearly remove en
tirely from the consideration of the jury the question of
the sufficiency of the proof of death.
They left nothing in that respect to the determination of
the jury.
[34]
3.
Is the Court Right in Saying That the After Discovered
Evidence Does Not Entitle the Defendant to
a New Trial?
The fact of there being after discovered evidence, and
its kind and character is shown by the record (page 27) in
the usual manner, by affidavit as follows:
"State of Virginia,
City of Richmond, to-wit:
I, J. McD. Wellford, counsel for the defendant
®in the case of 'Mary L. Botto v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company,' do make the following affi
davit: That subsequent to the trial of this case at
four o'clock in the afternoon of July 8th, I was
called up on the telephone by Sergeant Frank I.
Gentry of the Richmond Police Force, who then
advised me that he had seen and talked with the
insured, William J. Botto, in the year 1926; that he
had known said William J. Botto all his life and
that there could be no mistake as to identity. That
by no reasonable diligence on my part, or on the
part of the defendant company, could this evidence
have been secured prior to the trial of the case inas
much as neither I nor said defendant company had
any knowledge that Sergeant Gentry knew the in
sured or had seen him in 1926. That said evidence
is material in its object and such as ought, on an
other trial, to produce an opposite result of the
merits; and that said evidence is not merely cumu
lative or collateral.
J. McD. WELLFORD.
[35]
Subscribed and sworn to before me, Mary P.
Steinlein, a Notary Public in and for the City of
Kichmond, in the State of Virginia, this 11th day
of July, 1927.
MARY P. STEINLEIN,
Notary Public."
The opinion of the court holds that the availability of
this new evidence does not justify the award of a new trial
because:
(a) It was cumulative and corroborative;
(b) The failure of the defendant to secure it before the
trial proceeded from a lack of due diligence.
(a) It W<is Not Cmrndative or Corroborative.
The law in Virginia on the question of refusing new
trials on the ground of the evidence being cumulative or
corroborative is the same as the law elsewhere in the United
States. A carefully considered Virginia case in which
•Judge Burks wrote the opinion will be quoted from to
sustain this statement, ^'irst, however, we quote an ab
stract of the law as it exists throughout the United States,
as accurately stated in an excellent note in L. R. A., 1916,
C, page 1182:
"As a result of these principles several general
rules governing the granting of new trials on the
ground of cumulative evidence have been evolved
by the courts. It is required:
"1. That the newly discovered evidence be such
as could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
discovered in time to be produced at the trial.
[36]
"2. That it be such as to render a different re
sult probable on the retrial of the case.
"To these two requirements the courts generally
add two additional requirements:
"1. That the newly discovered evidence be not
merely impeaching evidence.
"2. That it be not merely cumulative.
"The only reason that can be assigned for these
last two requirements is that evidence of that kind
is in most cases not of such a decisive nature as to
make a different result probable on retrial. Re
verting to the basic principle underlying the whole
question, the court is concerned, not in measuring
the newly discovered evidence by definite, prescribed
rules, but in determining whether justice demands
the granting of the new trial; and, laying aside the
matter of diligence, only one great controlling ques
tion remains, viz., is the newly discovered evidence
such as is probable to produce a different verdict
if a new trial is had? And this question must be
answered affirmatively with respect to all evidence,
whether cumulative or not. The logical conclusion,
therefore, is that these last two requirements are
not of co-ordinate importance with the former two,
but that they are merely corollary to the require
ment of a/ probable change of verdict. Such being
the case, they cannot, of course, be given a broader
application than the rule to which they are corol
lary; and when the newly discovered evidence is
such as to render a different result likely on retrial,
the new trial must be granted, whether the new
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evidence is cumulative or impeaching, or both. To
refuse a new trial merely because the newly discov
ered evidence is cumulative, when it is conceded
that such evidence is likely to produce a different
result and correct the mistake in the verdict ren
dered, would be a pure denial of justice, without
sufficient cause; or reason.
"In a multitude of civil cases it has been held that
a new trial will not be granted for newly discovered
cumulative evidence. These cases are to be found
among the decisions of practically every jurisdic
tion, and at first glance seem to show a disposition
on the part of the courts to establish the rule against
cumulative evidence as being co-ordinate with the
rule against evidence which is not probable to pro
duce a different verdict, and as being likewise with
out exception. And among the cases cited are a num
ber in which the rules are set out and numbered
exactly as though they were of the same order of
importance. A consideration of all the cases, how
ever, shows that such is not their intention. These
cases can be explained either on the ground that
the facts did not call for a ruling that a new trial
would not be granted for cumulative evidence under
any circumstances, or on the ground that the cor
rect rule was not called to the attention of the court.
"In very few decisions is there given any ex
planation of, or reason for, the cumulative evidence
rule. The courts have applied it time after time
apparently* without considering its connection with
the body of the law governing new trial. The re
sult has been that courts seem for a time to have
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forgotten that the rule is a mere corollary and to
have come closer and closer to the point of viewing
it as an independent principle. And in more recent
years, when compelled to grant new trials for newly
discovered cumulative evidence because it was of
a character sufficient to make a different verdict
probable, the courts have used language indicating
a belief that they were making an exception to the
cumulative evidence rule, instead of realizing that
they were in fact limiting a corollary within the
bounds of the rule which it followed.
"In a few instances, however, the true relation
ship of these rules has been recognized. In one such
case, after referring respectively to the requisite of
due diligence and of the probability of a different
verdict, the court says: 'Where these, requisites oc
cur they constitute sufficient grounds for new trial,
and no others can be required. Hence, the rule, so
often reiterated by the courts, that a new trial
should not be granted where the evidence is merely
cumulative, must be regarded (in this State) not as
an independent rule, additional to those established
by the provisions * ♦ * of the Code, but as a
mere application of those rules, or, as it has been
expressed, as 'a corollary of the requirement that
the newly discovered evidence must be such as to
render a different result probable on a retrial of
the case.'
"In a nearly Indiana case it is likewise made to
appear clearlyi that the cumulative evidence rule is
regarded as merely corollary to the qualification
with respect to the production of a different result.
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There the court specifically sets out and numbers
the three qualifications which newly discovered evi
dence must satisfy, viz., '1. That it has come to his
(appellant's) knowledge since the trial. 2. That it
was not owing to a want of diligence that he did
not know it sooner; and 3. That it would probably
produce a different result.' The court then goes
on to say that it can form no opinion upon the last
point, because the bill of exceptions does not con
tain the evidence given at the trial, and concludes
with the statement: 'The new testimony may have
been cumulative only, and if so, a new trial will
not be granted; and we cannot know that it is not
cumulative unless we are informed what had been
proved before.'
'This view seems to be taken by the court which
says that, 'as the evidence is cumulative in its na
ture, a new trial would not he likely to change the
result.' And again by the court which says that
newly discovered evidence 'must make a clear case,
and not be merely cumulative, leaving the question
still doubtful.'
"In quite a number of cases the courts have rec
ognized the fact that a new trial should be granted
for newly discovered cumulative evidence, where it
is probable that the effect of such evidence would
be to produce a different verdict on retrial. And,
although the language used in many of such cases
seems to show a leaning toward the view that this
rule is an exception to the cumulative evidence rule,
the result reached is exactly the same as if they
viewed the cumulative evidence rule as a corollary
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to the general rule requiring the probability of a
different verdict on retrial.
"In other cases it is held that new trial will be
granted for newly discovered cumulative evidence
when it is positive and conclusive. Such language,
of course, is equivalent to requiring that the cumu
lative evidence be of sufficient force to render a
different verdict probable.
"In still other cases other language, also equiva
lent to the same requirement, has been used. In an
early Kentucky case it is said: 'The rule is well set
tled that, to sustain a bill for review or a new trial
at law, the evidence, if it applies to points formerly
in issue, must be of such a permanent nature and
unerring character as to preponderate greatly, or
have a decisive influence upon the evidence which
is to be overturned by it.' Thia rule is adhered to
in a number of cases in that jurisdiction.
"Again, it has been said that cumulative evidence,
to be a ground for new* trial, must be sufficient 'to
render clear and positive that which was before
equivocal and uncertain,' or that it must be such as
to 'render a doubtful case clear.' And in one case
it is said that cumulative evidence is a ground for
new trial 'when the point was left doubtful by the
testimony, » » ♦ and the newly discovered
testimony will remove all doubt.' In a very early
case it was said that, in order to induce the court
to interfere upon the grounds of newly discovered
cumulative evidence, 'the case must be a strong one.'
In an early Illinoii^ case it was said that the court
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*will rarely grant a new trial for the purpose of
letting in' cumulative evidence.
"In numerous cases the courts have said that for
reasons of justice a new trial will be granted for
newly discovered evidence that is cumulative. In
asmuch as justice will demand a new trial only
when there is some probability of a diiferent ver
dict, these cases are perfectly harmonious with those
just discussed. As stated at the beginning of this
section, the rule requiring the probability of a dif
ferent verdict is founded upon the demand for jus
tice. The reasons back of the whole matter are
aptly stated in a New York case: *There is the same
propriety and necessity for giving a party a new
trial, who can vindicate himself or sustain his cause
of action by cumulative evidence as there is for
any other reason. And there is certainly no justice
in subjecting a person to what is really an un
founded claim, or for preventing him for main
taining an equally well-founded defense, because
the evidence discovered by him by which that can
be done may be of the same quality or description
as that given upon the trial in which he has been
defeated.'
"While expressing themselves in various ways,
the courts seem practically unanimous in allowing
new trial for cumulative evidence in cases where the
probability of a different verdict on retrial makes
such a course just. In fact, only one case has been
found in which this rule has been denied. In a West
Virginia case the court, after admitting that the
newly discovered evidence would probably have
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changed the verdict, denied a new trial because it
was cumulative. This case, however, seems to have
been a mistake on the part of a court, whose at
tention had not been called to a proper understand
ing of the principle involved, rather than a delib
erate denial of the incontrovertible justice of the
rule adopted in other jurisdictions.
"The language used in a more recent Kentucky-
case ^Iso points to an attitude at variance with this
rule. A consideration of this case, however, in con
nection with the cases which it cites as authority
for its decision, leaves it extremely doubtful just
what was meant to be held. However, in view of
the number of Kentucky cases cited above, it is
evident that the rule in that State is well within
the line of authority,"
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 770, 775, it was
said:
"Evidence is said to be cumulative when it is of
the same kind, to the same point, and the discovery
of such evidence after verdict is, as a rule, no ground
for a new trial. Its exclusion, however, is not by
virtue of any independent rule, but rather as a
corollary of the rule that the newly discovered evi
dence must be such as would probably produce a dif
ferent result on the merits. Generally, evidence
that is merely cumulative, corroborative, or collat
eral, ought not and probably would not produce a
different result on the merits, and for that reason
is excluded, but if the court can see that a different
result on the merits ought or probably would be
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reached, if the evidence is received, it may, in such
exceptional cases, furnish ground for a new trial,
even though it is merely cumulative. There are few
cases in which some merely cumulative evidence
may not be discovered after the trial, and if such
discovery furnished ground for a new trial litigants
would not be diligent in the preparation of their
cases, and there would be no end of litigation. Pub
lic policy demands a prompt administration of jus
tice, and this could not be obtained if verdicts could
be so easily set aside. At the same time, the object
and aim of all litigation is the attainment of sub
stantial justice, and where, in the light of the after-
discovered evidence, grave doubt is entertained as
to the correctness of the verdict, and it seems prob
able that if the newly-discovered evidence had been
before the jury a diiferent verdict would have been
reached on the merits, the verdict should be set
aside. While it is desirable that there should be an
end of litigation with as little delay and expense as
possible, this object is subordinate to the great end
of litigation, to-wit, a correct decision of the cause
on its merits. Wolf v. Mahan, 57 Tex. 171.
"In State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462, 35 Pac. 367,
all of the witnesses at the trial were Indians, but
after the trial a white witness to the same facts
was discovered and a new trial was awarded. A
similar situation may at any time arise where all
the witnesses to a material fact were ignorant and
illiterate, and a witness of intelligence and charac
ter to the same fact is subsequently discovered.
"In Sluman v. Dolan, 24 S. D. 32, 123 N. W. 72,
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it is said that *the rule applicable to ordinary cumu
lative testimony on motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence is not appli
cable as applied to a case where a party to the
action is the principal witness. The rule as to cu
mulative evidence was adopted at a time when par
ties to an action were not permitted to testify as
witnesses therein. It is a well-known fact, of
which this court will take judicial notice, that jurors
generally view with more or less suspicion the tes
timony of an interested party in the case, and nat
urally attach to it much less weight than would be
given to the testimony of a disinterested witness.
To say, therefore, that the question of cumulative
testimony applies to testimony tending to corrobo
rate the evidence of a party to the action consti
tutes cumulative testimony, would often result in
great injustice being done to such parties. The
fact, therefore, that the testimony of Lyons would
tend to corroborate the testimony of the defendant,
and therefore constitute cumulative evidence within
the meaning of that term as used in the cases would,
in our opinion, work great injustice.*
"In Johnson's Case, 104 Va. 881, 52 S. E. 625,
the; holding of this court is thus summarized in the
syllabus: 'In the case at bar the evidence as to the
identification of the prisoner, as the perpetrator of
the crime charged in the indictment is very unsatis
factory, and the uncontradicted testimony of a de
tective, who was examined for the State, as to ma
terial facts tending to connect the prisoner with the
commission of the crime, must have produced upon
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the minds of the jury impressions very injurious to
the prisoner. The discovery after the trial of an
intelligent, disinterested witness of high character,
whose testimony, if true, indicates a purpose on the
part of the detective to compass the conviction of
the accused upon fabricated evidence, renders it
proper to grant a new trial for after-discovered
evidence.'
"In Barsa V. Kator, 121 Va. 290, 93 S. E. 613, a
new trial was granted because the after-discovered
evidence was more specific and circumstantial than
that given on the trial, and the court thought a dif
ferent result ought to be reached on the merits. See
also, Preston v. Otey, 88 Va. 491,14 S. E. 68; Holton
v. State, 9 Ga. App. 414, 71 S. E. 599."
All that this court needs to ask itself in order to deter
mine that this evidence of Sergeant Gentry was neither
cumulative nor corroborative is to ask whether if he had
testified, he being a responsible public officer, that he had
known the insured all his life, that there could have been
no mistake of identity, that he had seen and talked with
the insured in 1926, would that have probably produced a
different conclusion by the jury from the conclusion
reached, which was that the insured died in 1919? Bearing
in mind that the ultimate end to be gained in all litiga
tion is substantial justice, there cannot be an affirmative
answer to the question whether a new trial should be re
fused the defendant because of the fact that Sergeant Gen
try's evidence is cumulative and corroborative. It is from
a disinterested person of responsible position, who could
not be characterized as "biased or prejudiced," and there
fore a perjurer. It relates to a different year, and a later
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one, than that when the other witnesses for the defendant
saw the insured alive; so far from corroborating their tes
timony, Gentry does not purport to know anything what
ever as to whether their testimony was true or false.
(b) Was Defendant's Failure to Secure Sergeant Gentry's
Evidence Before the Trial a Failure which Pro
ceeded from a Lack of Due Diligence?
The opinion of the court charges the defendant with lack
of due diligence because "it seems to us that the investi
gator of the defendant would have made some inquiry of
the police sergeant as to the disappearance of the insured."
There are on the Richmond Police Force, as is well known
to all of the members of this court, a chief, several cap
tains, two scores or more of lieutenants and sergeants, and
numbers of ordinary officers. It has oftentimes been held
that a person is not chargeable with a negligent failure to
seek evidence because he does not go to one of whose abil
ity to testify he had no reason to suspect the existence. In
Barsa v. Kator, 121 Va. 290, at page 297, it was stated in
support of the granting of a new trial:
"It is not probable that by the exercise of rea
sonable forethought it would have occurred to the
defendant to inquire of this affiant concerning it."
Surely the defendant may not be reasonably charged
with the failure to have picked out Sergeant Gentry, as a
person who had seen the insured, the insured having been
absent from Richmond for seven years; Gentry is not
shown to have been personally known to any employee of
the defendant, or to its attorney, or to have been a police
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officer when he saw the insured, nor is the defendant shown
to have had any knowledge, until the plaintiff testified on
the trial, that the plaintiff had enlisted the aid of the police
in her search for the insured.
Equally surely, the defendant in the exercise of rea
sonable diligence had a right to assume that if the Rich
mond police, or any member of the police force knew that
Botto was alive, they would have reported the fact to his
wife; and that if such report had been made she would not
have claimed he was dead; and to have felt entirely safe in
an assumption that nothing could be gained by inquiry of
the Richmond police.
We respectfully submit that for the foregoing reasons a
rehearing should be grantee^ of this cause.
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